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Note
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism: Bringing
Temporary Treasury Regulations Back in Line
with the APA
Eleanor D. Wood*
―Under general administrative law doctrines, it would
seem unimaginable that the IRS could bypass notice-andcomment procedures, offer no required ‗good cause‘ explanation,
promise to take comments into account but ignore them and
then, more than a decade later, adversely invoke its temporary
regulation against a taxpayer.‖1 Such action might seem on its
face to be unimaginable, but this exact situation was recently
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2 At issue was whether a temporary Treasury regulation3 promulgated without following the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
informal rulemaking requirements4 and left on the books for

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
Gustavus Adolphus College. Thank you to Professor Kristin Hickman for her
guidance and encouragement in writing this Note. Additional thanks to the
editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their comments and critiques. Finally, thank you to my family for never ceasing to be my number one
fan club. Copyright © 2015 by Eleanor D. Wood.
1. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, Petaluma FX Partners, L.L.C. v.
Comm‘r, No. 12-1364, slip op. (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2015), 2014 WL 2601469, at
*18–19.
2. Petaluma FX Partners, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, No. 12-1364, slip op. (D.C.
Cir. June 26, 2015), was decided by the D.C. Circuit on June 26, 2015. The Replacement Brief for the Appellant was filed May 12, 2014. The Replacement
Brief for the Appellee was filed June 10, 2014, and the Replacement Reply
Brief for the Appellant was filed July 10, 2014. Oral arguments took place on
November 18, 2014.
3. The temporary regulation in question is Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.62331T (1999). Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 6. For the publication of this rule, see Miscellaneous Provisions Related to the Tax Treatment of Partnership Items, 52 Fed. Reg. 6779 (proposed March 5, 1987).
4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012) (requiring ―notice of proposed rulemaking‖ and ―an opportunity to participate in the
rule making‖).
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over fourteen years should be binding on a taxpayer.5 History
seems to imply, perhaps surprisingly, that the answer to this
question has always been yes,6 but should that continue to be
the case?
The Treasury Department (Treasury) has broad general
rulemaking power7 and has historically used this power to create new regulations promulgated under APA notice-andcomment procedures.8 However, out of supposed necessity, in
the 1980s the Treasury began increasingly using temporary
regulations, which follow no such promulgation procedure, yet
have the force of law when published.9 While Congress statutorily recognized10 the use of temporary regulations with the passage of 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e),11 it also expressed concerns12 about
regulations that might become ―permanently temporary‖13 and
tacked on a three-year sunset provision.14 However, the provision was not given retroactive application, effectively grandfathering in all temporary regulations issued prior to its enactment.15
Few cases have challenged Treasury non-compliance with
the APA, but the problem is getting harder to ignore. Courts
5. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 7, 9. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia avoided this issue by holding that a laterenacted final regulation, Treas. Reg. § 301.6233-1 (2001), was applicable to the
case, making the validity of the temporary regulation in question irrelevant.
See Petaluma, slip op. at 13–15.
6. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 15 (―We have not
found any case where a court has invalidated a temporary regulation for the
IRS‘s failure to follow the dictates of the APA . . . .‖).
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (giving the Treasury the power to ―prescribe all needful rules and regulations . . . in relation to internal revenue‖).
8. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 343 (1991).
9. Id.
10. For a discussion of what Congress actually meant by the passage of
§ 7805(e), see infra Part II.C.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e).
12. Compare S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988) (proposing, initially, a twoyear limitation), with H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 217–18 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)
(settling on a three-year limitation).
13. See Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary
Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX
L.J. 248, 254 (2003).
14. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(2).
15. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100647, § 6232(b), 102 Stat. 3734, 3735 (1988) (applying the three-year expiration
date only to regulations issued after the enactment of the Act).
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have started hinting that such procedural failings might invalidate a temporary regulation.16 In the past five years, courts
have also definitively held that the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) is subject to the APA17 and expressly rejected the idea of
tax exceptionalism—the belief that tax is special, or more specifically, that in law, tax should be given special treatment.18
Defenders of temporary regulations have, therefore, turned to
new arguments, claiming that such regulations are exempt
from procedural requirements for good cause,19 because they
are interpretive rules,20 or because § 7805 trumps the APA.21
Each of these arguments can be refuted, especially as they apply to grandfathered temporary Treasury regulations.
This Note argues that the IRS should no longer be able to
treat temporary Treasury regulations as legally binding on
taxpayers if they were promulgated in violation of the APA, but
it recognizes that invalidating all temporary regulations overnight would cause more problems than it solves. Part I of this
Note describes the historical development of temporary regula16. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that allowing notice and comment after a temporary regulation was enacted was ―not an acceptable substitute for pre-promulgation notice and comment‖); Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 491 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (―No
explanation has been forthcoming from the government as to why such a ‗temporary regulation,‘ issued in 1987 shortly after enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, should remain ‗temporary‘ well over a decade later . . . .‖); Kikalos
v. Comm‘r, 190 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that because it has not
been subjected to procedural scrutiny, a temporary regulation may be ―entitled
to no more deference than a proposed regulation‖); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of
Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 245–48 (2010), rev’d on other grounds,
650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (Halpern &
Holmes, JJ., concurring) (arguing that temporary Treasury regulations are not
―special‖ and should be subject to the APA‘s procedural requirements).
17. See Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en
banc).
18. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 56 (2011) (―We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as
our review of other regulations.‖); infra Part I.C.
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012) (providing an exception to the APA‘s
notice-and-comment procedures required for rule making when an agency ―for
good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest‖).
20. See id. § 553(b)(A) (providing an exception to the APA‘s notice-andcomment procedures required for interpretive rules).
21. See Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax
Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011, 1051 n.194 (2010) [hereinafter Legislative Entrenchment] (―[T]he IRS has frequently argued that § 7805(e) excuses the
Treasury from the APA‘s notice-and-comment requirements when it issues
temporary regulations.‖).
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tions, the movement away from tax exceptionalism, and the increasing interplay between administrative and tax law. Part II
examines the arguments defending and condemning the validity of temporary Treasury regulations and how the Mayo22 decision has further complicated the debate. Finally, Part III addresses potential solutions for bringing the Treasury back in
line with the APA without destabilizing the tax system. This
Note maintains that the Supreme Court‘s explicit rejection of
tax exceptionalism creates considerable doubt about the enforceability of temporary Treasury regulations promulgated in
violation of the APA. Therefore, this Note proposes several judicial and legislative actions that could be taken to correct the
procedural invalidity of temporary regulations and to make future Treasury promulgation policy administratively acceptable.
I. UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE VALIDITY OF
TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATIONS
Although temporary regulations have been used by the
Treasury for more than thirty years, only recently has their validity been cast into doubt. This Part outlines the development
and current status of temporary Treasury regulations. Section
A provides background on why temporary regulations came into existence. Section B discusses the procedural requirements
imposed by the APA on all agencies engaging in rulemaking activities. Section C explains the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Mayo to reject tax exceptionalism. Finally, Section D summarizes current scholarly, judicial, and Treasury views on temporary regulations.
A. THE RISE OF THE TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATION
The use of temporary Treasury regulations increased dramatically starting in the 1980s, when the Treasury was struggling to provide timely guidance on new and complex tax
laws,23 especially in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.24
By 1988, the practice had caught the attention of Congress.25
Recognizing that ―[g]enerally, temporary regulations are effec22. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 44. For more information on Mayo, see infra Part
I.C.
23. See Asimow, supra note 8.
24. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2085 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (making significant
changes to the tax code).
25. S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988) (―The IRS also issues some regulations as temporary regulations.‖).
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tive immediately upon publication and remain in effect until
replaced by final regulations,‖ the Senate expressed concern
―about the length of time that some regulations remain in temporary form.‖26 Responding to these concerns, Congress enacted
26 U.S.C. § 7805(e),27 which requires that all temporary regulations be simultaneously issued in proposed form and which sets
a three-year expiration period.28 The statute, however, was not
given retroactive application and, therefore, only applies to
temporary regulations issued after November 20, 1988.29
The IRS has taken the position that temporary regulations
issued prior to that date, which in this Note shall be referred to
as grandfathered temporary regulations,30 technically never
expire.31 Generally, courts have agreed that in limiting the effective date of the sunset provision of § 7805(e)(2) Congress exempted all regulations already on the books at that time from
mandatory expiration.32 While temporary regulations issued
today are binding on taxpayers for no more than three years
unless properly promulgated into final regulations, some
grandfathered temporary regulations have arguably had the
force of law for over twenty-five years.33
B. INFORMAL RULEMAKING PROCEDURE AND EXCEPTIONS
The Treasury‘s power to issue regulations, like that of any
other agency engaging in rulemaking, is based on a statutory
26. Id.
27. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 6232(b), 102 Stat. 3734, 3734 (1988).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(1)–(2) (2012).
29. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 § 6232(b); see Lyszkowski v. Comm‘r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2751, at 2759 n.2 (1995) (―Sec. 7805(e)
applies to temporary regulations issued after the date which is 10 days after
the date of enactment of [the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, which was enacted on] . . . Nov. 10, 1988.‖).
30. Some other scholars cleverly refer to such regulations as ―permanently
temporary.‖ See Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 13.
31. See Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1053–54.
32. See, e.g., Garnett v. Comm‘r, 132 T.C. 368, 372 n.11 (2009) (noting
that the temporary regulations at issue in the case were more than three
years old but still in force because ―[t]he temporary regulations involved herein [Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T] were issued Feb. 19, 1988, before the effective date of sec. 7805(e)‖).
33. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1987) (regulating personal interest); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T (1984) (regulating alimony and separate
maintenance payments). For a discussion on whether temporary regulations
carry the force of law, see Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013) [hereinafter Force of Law].
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delegation of power from Congress. While numerous provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code) provide specific
authority,34 the Secretary of the Treasury has also been endowed with the general authority to ―prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement‖ of the IRC.35 However,
with such power comes the responsibility to abide by the procedural requirements imposed by APA § 553.36
For informal rulemaking, the APA requires that an agency
publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register detailing the time, place, and nature of the public proceedings; referencing the relevant legal authority invoked; and
providing a description of the issue.37 An agency must then
provide sufficient time, generally thirty to ninety days, to ―give
interested persons an opportunity to participate‖ by submitting
written comments.38 After considering and addressing all significant comments, an agency can issue final regulations with
legally binding force, provided they incorporate a ―concise general statement of [the regulations‘] basis and purpose.‖39 The
final regulations can then become effective no sooner than thirty days after publication.40 Thus, the APA mandated process is
publication of non-binding proposed regulations, acceptance of
public comment, and then, but only then, promulgation of a final binding regulation.
The requirements of APA § 553 are ―[k]nown collectively as
notice-and-comment rulemaking‖ and must be utilized unless
one of the predefined exceptions apply.41 Generally, interpretive rules, procedural rules, and statements of policy are exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking.42 The APA, how34. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1735 (2007) [hereinafter APA
Rulemaking] (―In fact, the I.R.C. contains several hundred specific authority
grants.‖).
35. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
36. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2012).
37. See id. § 553(b).
38. Id. § 553(c); see also APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1732–33; The
Federal Register Tutorial, FED. REG., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/
tutorial/online-html.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (stating that the noticeand-comment comment period ―usually runs 30, 60 or 90 days from date of
publication‖).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
40. See id. § 553(d).
41. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1734.
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
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ever, does not define ―interpretive,‖ ―procedural,‖ or ―policy
statement,‖ so such rules are hard to distinguish from legislative or substantive rules, which must be properly promulgated.43 Similarly exempt are rules for which the agency can prove
it had good cause to bypass any or all of the APA § 553 requirements because such procedures were ―impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.‖44 However, to invoke the good cause exemption, an agency must justify its claim
with specificity and particularity.45
C. MAYO AND THE DOWNFALL OF TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
For years scholars have believed in the idea of tax exceptionalism—that, for one reason or another, tax is special in the
eyes of the law.46 Some commentators hold this belief because
of the tax system‘s inherent complexities,47 arguing that courts
are ill prepared to deal with tax controversies, so deference
should be given to the Tax Court or agency experts.48 Others
focus on the importance of tax revenue to the government‘s
ability to function49 or on the fact that tax ―touches human activities at so many points.‖50
43. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d
1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (detailing a four-part test to distinguish between
interpretive and legislative rules); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d
943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (laying out a two-part test to distinguish between
policy statements and legislative rules).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
45. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1780.
46. See Gene Magidenko, Tax Exceptionalism: Wanted Dead or Alive, 1 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 26, 27 (2011) (noting that, historically, Treasury regulations were evaluated under a different standard than regulations promulgated
by other agencies).
47. See Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63
DUKE L.J. 1897, 1903 (2014); see also id. at 1907 (―Albert Einstein is frequently quoted—including on the IRS website—as having said, ‗The hardest thing
in the world to understand is the income tax.‘‖ (citing Tax Quotes, IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Quotes (last visited Nov. 2, 2015))).
48. Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE
L.J. 1625, 1629 (2014) (―Although federal appellate courts usually review legal
questions decided by a trial court de novo, the Supreme Court, in Dobson v.
Commissioner, granted deference to the Tax Court on questions of tax law.‖).
49. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1596 (2006) [hereinafter
Need for Mead] (―The primary function of Treasury tax personnel and the IRS
is to collect government revenues . . . .‖); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to
Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558,
1567 (2011) (―Due to the importance of collecting revenue for the government,
[the IRS and Treasury] have extensive power and discretion relative to other
federal agencies.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also Bull v. United States, 295 U.S.
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Whatever the reason, attitudes toward tax exceptionalism
have begun to change. Scholars are now questioning whether
tax is really unique and whether special treatment is actually
warranted.51 However, the Supreme Court has already taken a
stance against special treatment. In its 2011 case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States,
the Court was asked to determine what level of deference
should be given to a Treasury regulation that implicitly made
the wages earned by medical residents subject to Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes.52 The Court unanimously53 held that it could find no ―justification for applying a
less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department
regulations than we apply to the rules of any other agency‖ and
that ―[i]n the absence of such justification, we are not inclined
to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax
law only.‖54 It could be argued that all Mayo stands for is the
fact that Treasury rules and regulations are now subject to
Chevron deference,55 but most in the tax community have taken
it to mean more—that the Supreme Court has decidedly rejected the idea of tax exceptionalism.56

247, 259 (1935) (―[T]axes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt
and certain availability an imperious need.‖); Tax Quotes, supra note 47 (―‗The
power of taxing people and their property is essential to the very existence of
government.‘ — James Madison, U.S. President.‖).
50. Dobson v. Comm‘r, 320 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1943); see Steve R. Johnson,
Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV.
269, 271 (2012) (―In its impact on our lives, the tax law is the single greatest
medium of interface between our government and our citizens.‖).
51. See Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63
DUKE L.J. 1835, 1879–80 (2014). See generally Need for Mead, supra note 49
(arguing that Treasury interpretations should not be given special judicial
deference).
52. 562 U.S. 44, 51 (2011).
53. The case was actually decided 8-0 as Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration or decision. Id. at 60.
54. Id. at 55.
55. Chevron deference is the standard of judicial review established in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. It requires a
court to defer to an agency‘s interpretation of a statute if ―the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue‖ and ―the agency‘s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.‖ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat‘l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
56. See Niki R. Ford, Easy on the MAYO Please: Why Judicial Deference
Should Not Be Extended to Regulations that Violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 799, 826 (2012) (describing the decision in Mayo as
―a devastating blow to the tax exceptionalists‖).
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D. THE CURRENT STATUS OF TEMPORARY TREASURY
REGULATIONS
Views on temporary regulations are shifting in the wake of
Mayo, so this Section outlines the current arguments and positions of scholars, courts, and the Treasury. Subsection 1 discusses the present judicial acceptance of temporary regulations,
but also summarizes recent opinions reflecting the courts‘ increasing skepticism. Subsection 2 then explains the Treasury‘s
current practices and its modern approach to defending the validity of temporary regulations.
1. Judicial Reactions to Temporary Regulations
Even before Mayo scholars were growing skeptical of the
validity of temporary regulations. Michael Asimow raised the
issue as early as 1991, questioning whether the ―frequent use of
temporary regulations is good policy.‖57 Courts, however, have
been slower to follow suit. In 1999, the validity of Temporary
Treasury Regulation § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), which stated that
the interest on underpayments of tax was personal interest and
not deductible by a taxpayer, was brought before the Seventh
Circuit.58 Although the court decided the case on other grounds,
it noted that the seemingly permanent nature of the temporary
regulation at issue was an interesting ―wrinkle‖ in the case.59
The court also hinted that if either party had questioned the
temporary regulation, the court might have been inclined to
hold that it was ―entitled to no more deference than a proposed
regulation.‖60 The following year, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a similar question and merely footnoted that ―[n]o explanation has been forthcoming from the government as to why
such a ‗temporary regulation,‘ issued in 1987 shortly after enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, should remain ‗temporary‘ well over a decade later.‖61
More recently, in 2010, the Tax Court found that Temporary
Treasury
Regulations
§§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T
and
301.6501(e)-1T were invalid and ―not entitled to deferential
57. Asimow, supra note 8, at 343.
58. Kikalos v. Comm‘r, 190 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 795. The court questioned the temporariness of the regulation
as it had been on the books since 1987, and the court could find no evidence
that it had been through notice-and-comment procedures in the twelve-year
period between promulgation and the decision. Id. at 795–96.
60. Id. at 796.
61. Tedori v. United States, 211 F.3d 488, 491 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000).
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treatment.‖62 The majority held the temporary regulations invalid because they were ―unambiguously in conflict with the
statute.‖63 Taking a different view, and only concurring in the
result, Judges Halpern and Holmes held that the regulations
were ―procedurally invalid under the Administrative Procedure
Act‖ because they were legislative in nature, but did not go
through the notice-and-comment process, nor did the Treasury
properly invoke an exception from APA procedure.64 Additionally, the concurrence specifically rejected the idea that § 7805(e)
is in conflict with the APA and, therefore, Congress implicitly
meant to waive the notice-and-comment requirement for all
temporary regulations.65
If the validity of temporary regulations is a functional argument, why are there so few cases raising it? Some commentators have argued that lawyers simply do not know that the
argument is out there,66 or that taxpayers have little to gain
from a procedural challenge.67 Others have pointed out that
even if a court believed a temporary regulation was procedurally invalid, a taxpayer may still lose their case because of the
harmless error rule.68 Whatever the reason, scholars have
started pointing out cases where the validity of the temporary
regulation at issue likely should have been raised. For example,
Professor Andy Grewal69 argued that in United States v. Woods
the parties could have questioned the Court‘s subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the case, because such jurisdiction rested
solely on a temporary regulation issued in 1987 and not finalized until after the taxpayer‘s transaction more than twelve

62. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 224
(2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 2120 (2012).
63. Id. at 227 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
64. Id. at 238–39.
65. Id. at 245–46.
66. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2008) [hereinafter Problem of
Remedy] (―Maybe tax lawyers are simply unaware of the procedural arguments available. Some degree of tax community ignorance of nontax administrative law principles undoubtedly contributes to the paucity of procedural
challenges.‖).
67. See id. at 1156 (―[S]tatutory and doctrinal limitations combine in the
tax context to deter taxpayers from pursuing APA compliance claims.‖).
68. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1791–92.
69. Andy S. Grewal is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Iowa specializing in the interaction between tax and administrative law.
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years later.70
2. The Treasury‘s Position on Temporary Regulations
While courts have rarely required the IRS to defend the validity of temporary regulations, the Treasury‘s position on temporary regulations can be gleaned from its practices. Even
though the Treasury acknowledges that it is subject to the
APA,71 it fails to use traditional APA procedures on a regular
basis. A study conducted by Professor Kristin E. Hickman72 on
the Treasury‘s compliance with the APA revealed that 40.9% of
regulations issued over a three year period failed to follow the
notice-and-comment process.73 For those issued as temporary
regulations—36.2% of all projects—the Treasury claimed that
APA § 553 did not apply 96.43% of the time.74 Although the
Treasury occasionally bases its claim on the good cause exception,75 its default inapplicability argument appears to be that
temporary Treasury regulations are interpretive.76
The Internal Revenue Manual actually explains that the
―[Internal Revenue] Service will generally rely on the necessity
of immediate guidance as good cause‖ and prescribes language
that should be included in the preamble of any regulation
claiming such exemption.77 Similarly, the IRS takes the position that ―most IRS/Treasury regulations will be interpretative
regulations because they fill gaps in legislation or have a prior
existence in the law‖78 or are promulgated based on a general

70. See ANDY S. GREWAL, THE MISSED JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT IN
―U.S. V. WOODS‖ 1 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369512.
71. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1729; see also Cohen v. United
States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (exemplifying a court‘s refusal
to shield the IRS from suits under the APA).
72. Kristin E. Hickman is the Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law at
the University of Minnesota Law School and teaches primarily tax and administrative law as well as statutory interpretation.
73. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1748 (analyzing 232 regulatory
projects published in the Federal Register between 2003 and 2005).
74. Id. at 1748, 1750 tbl.2a.
75. See id. at 1750 tbl.2a (detailing that the good cause exception is alleged 17.86% of the time while no real reason is provided 78.57% of the time).
76. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§ 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-005.html
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL] (―[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations
are interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA . . . .‖).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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grant of authority.79 Taking a slightly different approach, the
Treasury has also made the broader assertion that Congress
exempted all temporary regulations from APA requirements by
enacting § 7805(e).80 Additionally, there has been some discussion that, even if improperly promulgated, temporary regulations should be given Chevron deference just like any final
Treasury regulation.81
Temporary regulations have become a mainstream presence in the tax world over the last thirty years and have been
given significant deference by courts out of respect for the IRS.
However, times are changing. The Treasury‘s arguments that
temporary regulations are exempt from notice-and-comment
procedures were perhaps persuasive when tax exceptionalism
was alive and well, but in today‘s administrative law environment they leave something to be desired. What remains to be
seen is when and how courts and the Treasury will respond.
II. THE TREASURY‘S DEFENSES OF PROCEDURALLY
INVALID TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ARE
SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED BY THE REJECTION OF
TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
The Treasury has successfully defended its temporary regulations using a variety of alternative arguments, but in the
wake of Mayo these arguments may no longer be enough. This
Part discusses how the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax exceptionalism could strengthen taxpayer attacks on the validity of
temporary regulations promulgated in violation of the APA.
Section A analyzes why the Mayo Court was correct in refusing
to recognize a separate standard of administrative review for
tax purposes only. Section B then describes why APA § 553 exemptions, like those for interpretive rules82 and good cause,83
79. See Force of Law, supra note 33, at 475 (―When Congress enacted the
APA, the general consensus among courts and scholars held that the only
rules properly characterized as legislative were those promulgated pursuant to
a narrow and specific grant of authority to fill an explicitly identified statutory
gap . . . .‖).
80. See Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211,
245 (2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 650
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
81. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm‘r, 348 F.3d 136, 144
(6th Cir. 2003) (―The fact that the temporary regulation was not subject to notice and comment does not, moreover, require us to eschew Chevron deference
. . . .‖).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
83. See id. § 553(b)(B).
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should generally be considered inadequate defenses to complaints that the Treasury has failed to follow proper notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures. Section C argues that temporary regulations should not be upheld on the belief that Congress intended § 7805(e) to trump the APA. Finally, Section D
takes a closer look at how the above arguments apply in the
grandfathered temporary regulation context.
A. MAYO WAS CORRECT TO REJECT TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
Two of the main arguments in favor of tax exceptionalism
are that tax law is uniquely complex and that tax is special because of its relation to government funding. Although it is true
that the tax system is complicated and that the government
could not function without the revenue generated through taxation,84 is that enough to justify special judicial treatment for all
questions of tax law? The Supreme Court said no,85 and was
correct in doing so for two principal reasons.
First, the IRC may consist of numerous, somewhat daunting volumes, but in reality it is not unique in its complexity. In
fact, ―[i]t‘s mostly nontax people who think tax is special.‖86
Just as tax may seem complex to nontax accountants and lawyers, the rules surrounding the administration of social security benefits, environmental protection regulations, or anti-trust
laws may seem overwhelming to individuals not practicing in
those fields. Many scholars cite complexity as the reason courts
not specializing in tax should defer to agency expertise,87 but
unlike other technical areas where non-legal training might be
necessary to understand the law, interpreting the Internal
Revenue Code rarely requires scientific expertise.88 And ―despite their generalist profile, appellate courts are particularly
adept at interpreting statutes,‖89 so it stands to reason that
judges should be capable of tackling questions of tax law using
the same standard of review they apply in other cases.
84. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
85. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 60 (2011).
86. Zelenak, supra note 47, at 1906; see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia,
or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX
REV. 517, 519–28 (1994) (explaining that the belief that tax is uniquely complex is perpetuated by references to tax in law schools, the legal profession,
and popular culture).
87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. See Need for Mead, supra note 49, at 1599.
89. Id.
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Second, today‘s tax system does much more than simply
generate revenue.90 Congress frequently uses the IRC to incentivize socially acceptable or desirable behavior and to deliver
various forms of poverty relief.91 For example, the IRC permits
a single taxpayer to exclude from her calculation of taxable income up to $250,000 of gain from the sale of her principal residence if certain qualifications are met92 and to deduct interest
on up to $1.1 million of indebtedness related to a qualified residence.93 Both of these provisions are clearly not generating revenue, but, rather, were adopted to promote homeownership.
Similarly, the IRC also contains a provision providing certain
low income taxpayers with a dollar for dollar reduction in their
tax liability (even below zero, resulting in a refund) based on a
percentage of their qualifying earned income.94 This provision
has little to do with revenue acquisition and everything to do
with furthering the social policy in favor of providing welfare
support to the impoverished. By recognizing that the current
tax code governs vast topics and behaviors, not just revenue
collection, it is easier to understand why a tax exceptionalism
argument that focuses solely on the unique revenue generating
aspect of tax must fail. As Professor Leslie Book95 recently
pointed out, ―[t]he justification for [tax exceptionalism] . . . becomes less compelling as the Code takes on other roles beyond
pure revenue collection.‖96 For example, why should poverty re90. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 67–68
(2013) (―[T]he tax code has recently come to incorporate ‗policies aimed at the
environment, conservation, green energy, manufacturing, innovation, education, saving, retirement, health care, child care, welfare, corporate governance,
export promotion, charitable giving, governance of tax exempt organizations,
and economic development, to name a few.‘‖) (quoting Pamela F. Olson, Laurence Neal Woodworth Memorial Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . .
Lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (May 6, 2010) http://law.onu.edu/
sites/default/ files/Olson.pdf.
91. See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 793 (2014) (articulating how the ―war on poverty has moved
into the tax code‖ and why the ―federal government anchors many of its antipoverty initiatives in the nation‘s tax code‖).
92. See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
93. See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (Supp. I 2013); Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44
I.R.B. 571.
94. This provision is known generally as the Earned Income Tax Credit.
See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012).
95. Leslie Book is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Graduate
Tax Program at Villanova University School of Law.
96. Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 540 (2012).
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lief imbedded in the tax code be given special treatment when
poverty relief governed by other agencies is not? In carving out
all of tax law for special treatment, tax exceptionalists ignore
the fact that some, and in fact a significant portion, of tax law
has nothing to do with revenue.
B. THE TREASURY‘S UNPERSUASIVE USE OF APA EXEMPTIONS
Understanding some of the justifications for rejecting tax
exceptionalism helps explain why current Treasury actions often violate the APA and why the Treasury‘s arguments defending procedurally invalid temporary regulations are now unpersuasive. The APA has exemptions to its notice-and-comment
procedures for a reason,97 but the exemptions must be properly
invoked. As Professor Hickman‘s study noted, a three-year
sampling revealed that over 40% of Treasury regulations are
noncompliant with the APA, and when issuing temporary regulations the Treasury almost always claims that notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures do not apply.98 While the
Treasury is not alone in avoiding APA informal rulemaking requirements,99 such a high rate of exemption should raise red
flags because it appears the exception has swallowed the rule.
The Treasury‘s default response to claims that its temporary regulations deviated from proper APA procedure is usually
to assert that the regulation is exempt either because it is interpretive in nature or it qualifies under the good-cause exception.100 Many scholars have written extensively on the merits of
these claims in general,101 but how does the analysis change in
light of the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax exceptionalism?
97. By exempting things like interpretive rules and regulations issued to
correct a clerical error, the APA is recognizing that following proper noticeand-comment procedure can be a drain on resources that is unwarranted if
little would be gained by following such procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)–(b)
(B) (2012).
98. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
99. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC
COMMENTS (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf (―Agencies did
not publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), enabling the public to
comment on a proposed rule, for about 35 percent of major rules and about 44
percent of nonmajor rules published during 2003 through 2010.‖). The GAO
report studied the 568 major rules (those having an annual impact on the
economy generally exceeding $100 million) and over 30,000 nonmajor rules
published by U.S. agencies between 2003 and 2010. Id.; see also id. at 9 fig.1.
100. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 76, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1.
101. See generally Asimow, supra note 8; Problem of Remedy, supra note
66; APA Rulemaking, supra note 34; Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 13.
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This Section will argue that the tides have shifted in favor of
those claiming that certain temporary regulations are procedurally invalid. This Section will first analyze interpretive rule
assertions in the new post-Mayo administrative environment
and then examine claims of good cause.
1. Temporary Regulations Are Not Usually Interpretive
The APA provides no explanation of what it means by ―interpretive.‖ In most circuits, therefore, an agency‘s assertion
that a rule is interpretive rather than legislative is evaluated
under the standard established by the D.C. Circuit in American
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration.102
The court‘s four-part test asks (1) ―whether in the absence of
the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action‖; (2) whether the rule has been published in
the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) whether the agency used
its general legislative authority to promulgate the rule; and (4)
―whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule.‖103
An affirmative answer to any of these inquiries establishes that
the regulation has legal effect and should, therefore, be considered legislative and not interpretive.104 This test, while applied
regularly to actions of other agencies, is rarely used to analyze
Treasury regulations. Courts seem to resolve tax cases on other
grounds or simply accept the Treasury‘s argument that a temporary regulation is interpretive. This Note argues that this
phenomenon should be attributed to tax exceptionalism and
should persist no longer.
To illustrate this point, take the recent tax case Beard v.
Commissioner.105 Appealing from the Tax Court‘s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers, the Commission102. 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Intermountain Ins. Serv. of
Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 241 (2010) rev’d on other grounds, 650
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (Halpern & Holmes,
JJ., concurring) (explaining that the American Mining test has become the
―dominant standard‖ and has been adopted by at least six circuits (citing 1
PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4, at 454 (5th ed. 2010))); APA
Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1766.
103. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1112.
104. See id. But see Health Ins. Ass‘n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412,
423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the idea that publication in the Federal Register is dispositive of whether a regulation is legislative or not); Cmty. Nutrition
Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 947 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
105. 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). The
temporary
regulation
in
question
was
Temp.
Treas.
Reg.
§ 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) (1999). Id. at 623.
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er of the IRS spent a good portion of the appellant brief recognizing that ―[a]ppellees can be expected to argue that the regulations are procedurally invalid for failure to satisfy the APA‘s
notice-and-comment requirements‖106 and then detailing the
IRS‘s position that the regulation was interpretive and therefore exempt.107 Rather than referencing the American Mining
test, the Commissioner argued that any regulation promulgated by the Treasury in accordance with its general rulemaking
authority granted by § 7805(a) should be considered interpretive.108 Similarly, the brief cites two Seventh Circuit cases holding that regulations having a substantial impact on regulated
parties or altering a party‘s rights are not necessarily legislative.109 The Court‘s opinion on this issue merely noted that
―[m]uch ink has been spilled in the briefs‖ about the level of
deference to grant to the temporary regulation at issue, but ―we
need not reach this issue.‖110 Nevertheless, the Court did note
that it would be inclined to ―grant the temporary regulation
Chevron deference‖ whether it was interpretive or not, presumably because the regulation later went through the notice-andcomment process and was replaced by nearly identical final
regulations.111
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Seventh Circuit‘s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration112 in light of its holding in Home Concrete.113 Admittedly,
Beard was probably not the right case for an in-depth discussion of the validity of temporary regulations. However, it would
have been interesting if the Supreme Court had taken this opportunity to address the question of how to treat the interaction
between the APA and temporary Treasury regulations in the
wake of its Mayo decision. It could be argued that the case
106. Brief for the Appellant, Beard, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 093741), 2010 WL 3950613, at *32.
107. Id. at 32–38.
108. Id. at 33 (citing Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003)).
109. Id. at 36 (citing Nat‘l Org. of Veterans‘ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec‘y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Metro. Sch. Dist. v.
Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1992)).
110. Beard, 633 F.3d at 623.
111. Id.
112. Beard v. Comm‘r, 132 S. Ct. 2099, 2099 (2012).
113. See generally United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S.
Ct. 1836 (2012) (holding that the same Treasury regulation at issue in Beard
was invalid and not entitled to Chevron deference because a prior Supreme
Court case, Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), had found the statute
in question unambiguous and provided the only binding interpretation).
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would have turned out the same, with a remand to the lower
court. In rejecting tax exceptionalism, the Supreme Court in
Mayo stated that it was ―not inclined to carve out an approach
to administrative review good for tax law only.‖114 By invalidating the Treasury‘s interpretation of a statute at Chevron step
one,115 because congressional intent was clear as the statute
was unambiguous on its face, the Seventh Circuit in Beard
treated the Treasury the same as any other agency.116 On the
other hand, if the Seventh Circuit had applied the American
Mining test, it might have found that the regulation was procedurally invalid. The regulation at issue stated that an overstatement of basis in ownership interests is an omission of income, therefore, triggering a six-year statute of limitations.117
Arguably, in the absence of this regulation there would not be
an adequate legislative basis for enforcement since the default
statute of limitations is only three years, making the regulation
legislative under the first prong of the American Mining test. It
follows, then, that as a legislative rule, the regulation is not exempt from APA requirements and is procedurally invalid because it was not promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment
procedures. This leads to the same end result, but would have
sent a very different message to the Treasury—that tax exceptionalism will no longer be tolerated.118
2. Treasury Claims of Good Cause Need Better Substantiation
APA § 553 also provides an exemption from notice-and114. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
55 (2011).
115. Chevron step one is questioning whether a ―statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue‖ and if not, then to ―give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.‖ Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
116. Beard, 633 F.3d at 617.
117. See id.
118. This Note is not arguing that all temporary Treasury regulations
should be considered legislative, but merely that with the Supreme Court‘s
rejection of tax exceptionalism courts should judge the Treasury‘s actions under the same level of review as that used with other agencies. As pointed out
by Judges Halpern and Holmes, this means recognizing that ―the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) draws the line between legislative and other regulations differently [than tax law].‖ Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v.
Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 240 (2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (citing
Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in
Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX
LAW. 479, 484–85 (2008, rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
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comment procedure for ―good cause.‖119 Like the interpretive
exemption, agencies claim they have good cause for bypassing
APA procedures on a regular basis. In fact, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that over an eight-year
period, agencies used the ―good cause‖ exception for ―77 percent
of major rules and 61 percent of nonmajor rules [published]
without [a notice of proposed rulemaking],‖120 so the Treasury
is certainly not alone when making such an assertion. Tax exceptionalism remains prevalent in the level of deference courts
give to the Treasury‘s good cause claims despite the fact that
such claims are often unsupported.
The APA‘s only guidance on what is ―good cause‖ is to note
that the exemption can be invoked when an agency finds that
notice and comment would be ―impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest.‖121 Given this lack of statutory
guidance, courts often look to the Attorney General‘s Manual
on the Administrative Procedure Act,122 which provides a fairly
narrow interpretation of good cause but does give agencies
some ―flexibility in dealing with emergencies and typographical
errors, plus the occasional situation in which advance notice
would be counterproductive.‖123 Most courts have become increasingly skeptical of good cause claims and, therefore, have
started demanding that an agency provide more than a cursory
explanation of their need to skip notice and comment. For example, in the D.C. Circuit case, Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Court came down hard on the
EPA‘s attempt to invoke the good cause exemption to avoid
APA procedures when promulgating an interim-final rule protecting a single noncompliant engine manufacturer.124 In its
quite quotable opinion, the Court held that ―[w]e have repeatedly made clear that the good cause exception ‗is to be narrowly
construed and only reluctantly countenanced‘‖125 and that ―the
119.
120.
121.
122.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012).
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 15 fig.5.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S MANUAL]; see APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1759 n.119 (noting that the Attorney General‘s Manual is ―generally regarded as an authoritative
interpretation of the APA‖).
123. APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1782; see ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S
MANUAL, supra note 122, at 30–31.
124. 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
125. Id. at 93 (quoting Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d
749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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exceptions at issue here are not ‗escape clauses‘ that may be
arbitrarily utilized at the agency‘s whim.‖126 In a similarly critical opinion, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held
that ―[i]t is axiomatic that a mere recital of good cause does not
create good cause. Similarly, a desire to provide immediate
guidance, without more, does not suffice for good cause.‖127
On the other hand, when the Treasury issues temporary
regulations, it frequently gets by merely reciting the language
suggested by the Internal Revenue Manual—―[t]hese regulations are necessary to provide taxpayers with immediate guidance. Accordingly, good cause is found for dispensing with notice and public comment . . . .‖128 In the wake of Mayo, such
cursory language should no longer suffice. Rejecting tax exceptionalism and applying the Mack Trucks or Mobil Oil opinions
to any such Treasury regulation would likely lead to invalidation of the temporary regulation for violating the APA and force
the Treasury to provide a much more compelling and factspecific reason for its need to bypass APA procedures.
C. SECTION 7805(E) DOES NOT TRUMP THE APA
If the Mayo opinion weakens most Treasury claims of APA
exemption for good cause or interpretive rules, what is left in
the Treasury‘s arsenal? The most intriguing argument might
be that in enacting § 7805(e) Congress intended to trump the
APA and exempt all temporary regulations from notice-andcomment procedure.129 In some sense, this is a much stronger
argument for the Treasury because if a court were to adopt
such a position, then the Treasury would not have to prove its
regulation satisfied any of the enumerated APA exemptions.
Rather, all temporary regulations would simply be beyond the
126. Id. (quoting Am. Fed‘n of Gov‘t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
127. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep‘t of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 803 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1979).
128. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 76, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1; see also
APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1781 (―Several projects studied asserted
good cause using only this language, or something closely resembling it.‖).
129. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellant at 6, Salman Ranch, Ltd. v.
Comm‘r, 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2100 (2012), No. 099015, 2010 WL 2397312 (―The provisions of § 7805(e) . . . show that Congress
authorized Treasury to issue temporary regulations without notice and comment . . . .‖); Respondent‘s Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Order and Decision at 20, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211
(2010), No. 25868-06, 2010 WL 6754791 (―Section 7805(e) provides a specific
statutory exemption to the general statutory requirements of the APA.‖).
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reach of notice-and-comment requirements. This is a dangerous
road for courts to start down for three principal reasons.
First, despite some views to the contrary,130 § 7805(e)‘s legislative history does not support the assertion that § 7805(e)
was enacted to free temporary tax regulations from all noticeand-comment procedures, and APA § 559131 in particular
should dispel such a claim. The Treasury‘s chief argument
along these lines is that § 7805(e) conflicts with APA § 553 and
in the face of such conflict ―a specific statute controls over a
general one ‗without regard to priority of enactment.‘‖132 While
the specific versus general distinction is generally true, the
APA is specifically protected from such claims by APA § 559,
which provides that a ―[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to
supersede or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent
that it does so expressly.‖133 As Judges Halpern and Holmes
put it, ―exceptions to the APA‘s terms cannot be inferred—
much less inferred from an absence in the legislative history.‖134 Since nothing in the statutory language of § 7805(e), or
in its sparse legislative history, even mentions the APA, it
seems farfetched to claim that Congress expressly superseded
or modified the APA by enacting § 7805(e).135
130. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Appellant, supra note 129, at 6 (arguing
that the legislative history of § 7805(e) supports the assertion that ―Congress
authorized [the] Treasury to issue temporary regulations without notice and
comment by requiring any temporary regulation to be issued also as a proposed regulation‖).
131. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
132. Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961) (quoting
Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883)).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 559; see Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (articulating support for the express statement requirement created by APA § 559
because ―[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation
and diversity‖ and ―[i]t would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on
the basis of a requirement ‗recognized‘ only as ambiguous‖). It is also worth
noting that APA § 559 was last amended in 1978, so § 7805(e), which was added to the IRC in 1988, would qualify as a subsequent statute.
134. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 134 T.C. 211, 246
(2010) (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d
691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
135. Id. at 245; see Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1054–58;
see also Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 244 (―The legislative history does note that
the Secretary [of the Treasury] commonly issued temporary regulations with
immediate effect, but this alone hardly suggests Congress meant to waive notice and comment for all temporary regulations.‖). But see Reply Brief for the
Appellant, supra note 129, at 6–7 (asserting that the legislative history of
§ 7805(e) does support such a position because it stated that Congress intended for the temporary nature of a regulation not to affect its validity if finalized
in accordance with the three year sunset provision and arguing that ―[i]f the
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Second, the APA and § 7805(e) can be interpreted to be
complimentary rather than conflicting with one another. In a
persuasive amicus brief, Professor Hickman urged the Court to
hold that rather than authorizing the Treasury to forego noticeand-comment procedures for all temporary regulations,
§ 7805(e) actually imposes extra requirements.136 Such a cooperative reading essentially argues that if a regulation is exempt
from APA rulemaking procedures under APA § 553, then the
Treasury may issue the regulation in temporary form, but only
if it also issues it in proposed form and finalizes it within three
years as required by § 7805(e). The converse argument being, if
the regulation is not exempt under APA § 553, then it cannot
be issued in temporary form and § 7805(e) simply does not apply. Not only does this position resolve the argument that
§ 7805(e) trumps the APA, for if the statutes are in harmony
the Treasury can no longer claim that the specific trumps the
general, but it also reconciles nicely with § 7805(e)‘s legislative
history and is a step towards ending tax exceptionalism. One of
the few things Congress noted when enacting § 7805(e) was
that ―[t]he committee is also concerned about the length of time
that some regulations remain in temporary form.‖137 If a temporary Treasury regulation satisfies one of the APA § 553 exemptions, then, strictly looking at the APA, it could remain on
the books in temporary form indefinitely. Because the Treasury
frequently asserts such exemptions, it makes sense that by
adopting § 7805(e) and imposing the additional constraint that
the Treasury must finalize every temporary regulation within
three years of its promulgation,138 Congress was actually attempting to force the Treasury to stop avoiding notice-andcomment procedures.139 Furthermore, this cooperative interpretation of the APA and § 7805(e) fits nicely into a post-Mayo
administrative law world. It recognizes that the APA applies in
full force to the Treasury just like any other agency and that
courts do not have to ―carve out an approach to administrative
absence of notice and comment could deprive temporary regulations of validity, then § 7805(e) would be meaningless, violating the canon of construction
that ‗a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words‘‖ (quoting
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995))).
136. Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 16, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 1836
(2012), No. 11-139, 2011 WL 6813230.
137. S. REP. NO. 100-309, at 7 (1988).
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(e)(2) (2012).
139. See Brief of Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 136, at 18.
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review good for tax law only.‖140
Third, a court should consider the broader implications of
interpreting § 7805(e) as overriding APA requirements for temporary regulations. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, ―[t]he purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking is to ‗assure[] fairness
and mature consideration of rules having a substantial impact
on those regulated.‘‖141 Allowing the Treasury to skip noticeand-comment procedures on all temporary regulations dilutes
this purpose by allowing the exception to swallow the rule. It is
also important to note that ―our system of taxation depends on
a high degree of citizen ‗buy in.‘‖142 The IRS ―audits only a
small percentage of the hundreds of millions of returns filed
each year,‖143 so taxpayers who self-report are the primary
source of government revenue. This revenue could be at risk
because voluntary compliance could decline if taxpayers lose
faith in the validity of Treasury regulations, especially if taxpayers feel they have been deprived of the opportunity to comment on and influence a regulation before it becomes binding.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, therefore, gives legitimacy to
Treasury actions and helps ensure future public participation.
D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER FOR GRANDFATHERED
TEMPORARY REGULATIONS
Many of the arguments for finding current temporary regulations procedurally invalid apply in full force against grandfathered temporary tax regulations and might even be more persuasive in that context.144 For starters, any claim that § 7805(e)
trumps APA § 553, thereby exempting Treasury regulations
from notice and comment, must fail on its face. By definition,
the grandfathered rules were promulgated before § 7805(e) was
140. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
55 (2011).
141. United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 931 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 645 F.2d 360, 371 (5th Cir.
1981)); see also Asimow, supra note 8, at 366 (explaining the democratic purposes of notice-and-comment procedures by commenting ―the undemocratic
power of rulemaking is alleviated by allowing the persons affected to have a
say about the rules and by requiring the agency to read and respond to their
comments‖).
142. Johnson, supra note 50, at 290–91.
143. Id. at 291.
144. See Legislative Entrenchment, supra note 21, at 1057 (―Many temporary regulations issued prior to November 21, 1988, are likely now invalid because of the Treasury‘s failure to allow the public to comment on them.‖).
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enacted, and as § 7805(e) was given only prospective application it cannot be an argument here. That leaves the Treasury
with the classic APA exceptions. Admittedly, there might be
some grandfathered temporary tax regulations that would
properly qualify for an interpretive rule or good cause exemption, but it is equally likely that courts at that time merely deferred to the Treasury‘s assertions that it had complied with
the APA. For example, in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, the court dealt with a grandfathered temporary regulation enforced against a taxpayer more than ten years after it
was promulgated.145 The appellee argued that there would be
no jurisdiction for the case but for the invocation of the procedurally invalid temporary regulation.146 If such an assertion is
true, then it appears that the first prong of the American Mining test could be used to argue that the temporary regulation
was legislative because in its absence ―there would not be an
adequate legislative basis for enforcement action.‖147 Similarly,
in enacting Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6233-1T, the
Treasury did not include a contemporaneous assertion of good
cause or explain its reasoning with any specificity, but simply
cited its need to provide ―immediate guidance to partners and
partnerships affected and to the Internal Revenue Service in
the conduct of partnership examinations.‖148 In the wake of
Mayo, a mere reference to immediate guidance likely would be
insufficient to qualify for the good cause exemption. Likewise, it
should be noted that a claim of immediate guidance seems
much less compelling more than a decade after a rule‘s promulgation.
Throughout this Part, this Note argues that, despite the
Supreme Court‘s holding in Mayo, tax exceptionalism is still
alive and well in the temporary Treasury regulation context.
Despite the Treasury‘s frequent claim that it uses temporary
regulations to provide immediate guidance, the practice only
causes more confusion as it clashes with Supreme Court precedent and generally applicable administrative procedures. This
Note does not suggest that the Treasury must use notice-andcomment procedures every time it acts, rather, it argues that
145. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
146. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 5.
147. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
148. Replacement Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 8–9 (quoting Miscellaneous Provisions Relating to the Tax Treatment of Partnership Items, 52
Fed. Reg. 6779, 6780 (Mar. 5, 1987)).
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the Treasury should no longer receive special treatment from
the judicial system.
III. SOLUTION: ENDING TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
SURROUNDING TEMPORARY TREASURY REGULATIONS
The Treasury must comply with the APA like any other
agency, but the question now becomes how to get it to comply
without destabilizing the tax system. This Note suggests that
judicial or congressional action is needed to finally end the tax
exceptionalism practices surrounding temporary Treasury regulations. Section A briefly addresses why maintaining the status quo or immediately invalidating all temporary regulations
are not practical solutions. Section B then proposes potential
avenues courts and Congress can take to bring the Treasury
back in line with APA mandated procedures.
A. EXTREME SOLUTIONS ARE NOT THE ANSWER
If Mayo rejected tax exceptionalism almost four years ago,
why is the Treasury not treated like any other agency by now?
One answer might be that changing precedent through the
court system is a slow process, but in the case of tax exceptionalism other factors are in play. For starters, based on current
trends, the issue is simply not in front of courts enough to result in any real impact.149 Then, even if the procedural invalidity of a regulation makes it into a taxpayer‘s brief, it is usually
one of numerous alternative arguments and rarely gets much
discussion by the court.150 Additionally, the Treasury has little
incentive to change its practices. In the current administrative
law climate, temporary regulations promulgated without notice-and-comment procedures are treated as binding on taxpayers, so the added enforcement benefit of complying with the
APA is basically nonexistent. It is most likely true that the
Treasury does not avoid such administrative procedure out of

149. For a discussion of why such cases rarely make it to the courts, see
supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Problem of Remedy, supra
note 66, at 1157 (―In other words, statutory provisions and the courts‘ own jurisprudence combined discourage procedural challenges against Treasury regulations to the point of denying taxpayers an adequate judicial remedy to vindicate procedural rights granted in the APA.‖).
150. Compare Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106 (arguing extensively
against procedural invalidity), with Beard v. Comm‘r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.
2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (dedicating only one cursory paragraph
to the issue and deciding the case on other grounds).
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some conniving or malicious intent,151 but, just like any other
agency, it would rather not use its limited resources on APA
compliance if it does not have to.152 Therefore, if no action is
taken by the courts or judiciary, the Treasury will likely maintain the status quo, which leaves all temporary regulations
binding on taxpayers despite their noncompliance with the
APA.
At the other extreme, any Supreme Court or congressional
action that simply declares that all temporary Treasury regulations are invalid would be a similarly poor solution. Taxpayers
rely heavily on the stability of the Code for planning purposes
and fully expect that the Treasury regulations on the books are,
at a minimum, reliable guidance. The instability that would be
caused by such invalidation could be detrimental to the tax system both because it could alienate taxpayers, potentially reducing voluntary compliance and therefore revenue, and because it
would compel the Treasury to hurriedly fill the gaps in tax law
previously dealt with by such regulations.153 A declaration that
temporary regulations are invalid could also implicate the validity of regulations originally issued in temporary form, but
later finalized with post-promulgation notice and comment.154
Furthermore, such action would be hard to reconcile with the
legislative history of § 7805(e), which specifically notes that
―[t]he expiration of temporary regulations at the end of this
[three]-year period is not to affect the validity of those regulations during the [three]-year period.‖155 Given the problems
with these solutions, it is clear that another approach is necessary.

151. See APA Rulemaking, supra note 34, at 1799 (―APA noncompliance [is]
the unanticipated and unintended consequence of the well-intentioned pursuit
of alternative priorities.‖).
152. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX
NOTES 1251, 1264 (2011) (―For temporary regulations issued after the effective
date of section 7805(e), the IRS generally attempts to issue final versions before the end of the three-year expiration period. However, there appears to be
no corresponding effort to issue final versions of the older temporary regulations.‖).
153. See Asimow, supra note 8, at 373.
154. See Force of Law, supra note 33, at 471 (―But if the temporary regulations were procedurally defective, at least some courts may feel bound to find
final regulations with temporary origins to be similarly invalid.‖).
155. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 218 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). The original Senate Report called for a two-year sunset provision, which was later changed to
three years by the conference agreement. Id.
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B. RECOGNIZING THAT TAX EXCEPTIONALISM IS DEAD
Rejecting the two extremes—maintaining the status quo
and affirming all temporary regulations or invalidating all
temporary regulations—still leaves some more balanced approaches that could be used to transition the Treasury away
from tax exceptionalism and back to APA compliance. Rather
than proposing one solution, this Note suggests several options
that could be used alone or in tandem with each other.
First, courts could simply be less deferential to unsupported Treasury claims that any given temporary regulation is exempt from APA procedure. The invalidation of even a few temporary regulations accompanied by a judicial opinion explicitly
noting the lack of substantiation for avoiding notice and comment could be the push the Treasury needs to start supporting
its exemption assertions with specificity and particularity like
other agencies. The Treasury does not want to go through all
the work of promulgating a temporary regulation just to have it
invalidated.156 Once the Treasury realizes that courts will no
longer be satisfied by an assertion of ―the need for immediate
guidance,‖ it should have sufficient motivation to change and
maybe even update the Internal Revenue Manual. Two downfalls of this approach are that it could prove slow and would only be effective if implemented consistently. Courts can only take
such a position if they hear cases properly raising the issue
and, currently, such cases are few and far between.157 To
achieve the most expansive results with this approach, it would
be best for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a relevant
case, hold that the temporary regulation in question is invalid,
and articulate that the regulation would have been legally
binding if promulgated in accordance with the APA or if an exception from the APA had been properly invoked. Then lower
courts could follow suit and cite the Supreme Court case as
binding precedent.
Second, courts could adopt the position suggested in Professor Hickman‘s amicus brief to Home Concrete158 and explicitly hold that requirements imposed by § 7805(e) are additions,
not alternatives, to APA notice-and-comment rulemaking pro156. C.f. Force of Law, supra note 33, at 533 (―By the time that it issues
proposed regulations, Treasury has already accomplished much of the work of
promulgating final regulations.‖).
157. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
158. See Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 136, at 15–19.
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cedures for the Treasury. Alone or paired with the first suggestion, this could be an effective means of increasing Treasury
compliance with the APA. It still allows the Treasury to promulgate temporary regulations, just like any other agency, but
only when it possesses valid and persuasive reasons for doing
so. Additionally, it addresses congressional concerns about the
length of time Treasury regulations remain temporary by reaffirming the three-year sunset provision of § 7805(e)(2). However, like the first solution, this option suffers from the need for
the right case to be brought before the courts.
Third, courts could embrace what the Seventh Circuit
hinted at in Kikalos v. Commissioner—that procedurally invalid temporary regulations should be ―entitled to no more deference than a proposed regulation.‖159 Standing alone, this suggestion would encourage the Treasury to become more
administratively compliant, because it establishes a bright-line
test between what would be legally binding on taxpayers and
what would be deemed unenforceable guidance. After application by a few courts, the Treasury would understand that to be
given the force of law by courts a regulation must be promulgated in accordance with the APA. Paired with the first two solutions, this option is also a good alternative to hasty invalidation of all temporary regulations. It would allow temporary
regulations that have not gone through full notice-andcomment procedure and that do not otherwise properly qualify
for an APA § 553 exemption to still be used as guidance, but
not to be negatively invoked against a taxpayer. In essence,
they would have the same power as a proposed regulation or
other informal IRS guidance and any penalties imposed by
them would be unenforceable until post-promulgation noticeand-comment procedures were completed.160 By adopting this
position, courts would also incentivize the Treasury to use APA
procedures on a more frequent basis for any temporary regulation it intends to be legally binding. Again, this option would be
most effective if adopted in a Supreme Court opinion, so as to
prevent inconsistent application by lower courts, which would
cause more confusion than it would resolve.
159. 190 F.3d 791, 796 (7th Cir. 1999).
160. Concerns about the validity of regulations made final only through
post-promulgation are beyond the scope of this Note, but see Ford, supra note
56, at 836 n.265 (―[T]he promulgation of temporary regulations concurrent
with notices of proposed rulemaking violates the APA, because postpromulgation notice-and-comment is not a valid substitute for statutorily required pre-promulgation notice-and-comment.‖).
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Fourth, a more sweeping possibility would be for Congress
to amend the APA to include a section explicitly detailing its
position on interim and temporary regulations. The Treasury is
not the only agency increasing its use of temporary regulations,161 so additional congressional guidance might be warranted for all agencies. Such a provision could speak to the
amount of deference courts should grant to interim rules, could
impose an expiration period for temporary regulations similar
to the one imposed by § 7805(e), or could address the validity of
only using post-promulgation notice-and-comment procedures.
The benefit of this solution is that its effect could be farreaching and it would resolve many issues currently plaguing
the courts. However, the problem with this option is that congressional action takes time. Unlike the gradual, but immediate, change that could be achieved through judicial action, if
Congress tried to implement new policies, the tax community
might not see any change for a few years.162
Finally, to deal with any outstanding grandfathered temporary regulations, this Note proposes two alternative options.
Courts could apply the same degree of deference discussed in
the third solution—deference equivalent to that accorded to
proposed regulations—or Congress could add to § 7805(e) and
invoke a sunset provision for grandfathered regulations. The
latter option could mimic § 7805(e) and explicitly state that any
temporary regulation issued prior to November 22, 1988 will
expire within three years. The goal being to give the Treasury
time to finalize through notice and comment any regulations it
desires to continue to enforce and to give taxpayers time to adjust their plans accordingly.
While any of these solutions alone would be a step towards
the end of tax exceptionalism, this Note suggests that a combination of the first three proposals would be the most effective in
bringing the Treasury in line with the APA without destabilizing the tax system and, importantly, could be plausibly implemented. By applying the first suggestion and refusing to give
deference to unsubstantiated claims of exemption from the
APA, courts would push the Treasury to act like other agencies
161. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 42 fig.10.
162. C.f. Independence Hall Association, How a Bill Becomes a Law,
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/6e.asp (last visited Nov. 2,
2015) (explaining that ―less that [sic] 10% of proposed bills actually become
laws‖ and that ―[m]any people criticize Congress for its inefficiency and the
length of time that it takes for laws to be passed and enacted,‖ but also noting
that such a lengthy process is intentional and allows for proper deliberation).
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and articulate its need to bypass notice-and-comment procedures. This in turn would make it easier for courts to determine
if a regulation is properly exempt. If so, then a court could apply the second suggestion and require the Treasury to also
comply with § 7805(e). If not, or if the Treasury failed to satisfy
the requirements of § 7805(e), then a court can apply the third
suggestion and hold that the regulation at issue is unenforceable against a taxpayer, but may nonetheless still represent valuable guidance. Even if the lower courts are slightly inconsistent in their application, if they adopt any combination of
these three approaches, the Treasury will be forced to become
more administratively compliant to ensure its temporary regulations are legally binding. Together these approaches also provide stability to the tax system because they would be implemented gradually, one temporary regulation at a time, as cases
are raised before the courts. Thus, they would allow taxpayers
and the IRS sufficient time to adapt, unlike the fourth option—
congressional action—which might lead to an abrupt systemwide change and leave taxpayers scrambling to adjust. Additionally, with proper education of taxpayers and lawyers about
the availability of the argument of procedural invalidity, we
should see more cases where courts could actually implement
this change. While these suggestions may not end all instances
of tax exceptionalism, at the very least they should push the
Treasury in the desired direction of being more compliant with
the APA.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court‘s rejection of tax exceptionalism, the belief that tax should be afforded special treatment
remains prevalent, especially in Treasury practices and court
decisions surrounding temporary tax regulations. With few
cases challenging the validity of temporary regulations and
even fewer courts tackling the issue head on, this problem is
likely to persist. As long as the judicial system continues to allow the Treasury to operate in its own administrative environment, making conclusory assertions of good cause and claiming
statutory exemption from APA procedure for all temporary
regulations, the Treasury has no incentive to change its ways.
Therefore, taxpayers and the courts should take a stance
against tax exceptionalism. Taxpayers need to raise claims asserting that temporary regulations promulgated without noticeand-comment procedures should no longer be legally binding.

WOOD_4fmt

2015]

1/3/2016 12:55 PM

REJECTING TAX EXCEPTIONALISM

869

Then courts can insist on proper substantiation, require a complementary reading of § 7805(e) and APA § 553, and give little
deference to noncompliant regulations. Such judicial action will
force the Treasury to bring temporary regulations back in line
with the Administrative Procedure Act.

